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REVIEW ESSAY 
A SQUARE PEG IN A VICIOUS CIRCLE: 
STEPHEN BREYER'S OPTIMISTIC 
PRESCRIPTION FOR THE REGULATORY 
MESS 
ERIC J. GOUVIN* 
BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE: TOWARD EFFECTIVE RIsK 
REGULATION. By Stephen Breyer. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press, 1993. Pp. 3, 124, notes, index. $22.95 cloth, 
$14.95 paper. 
Long before his appointment to the United States Supreme 
Court, Stephen Breyer established his academic credentials as a 
scholar of the regulatory process. l His most recent book on 
regulatory reform, Breaking the Vicious Circle: Toward Effective 
Risk Regulation,2 undoubtedly will attract attention from the 
legal and regulatory communities on the basis of his academic 
and legal background alone.3 Nonetheless, his recent ascension 
to the high court is certain to spark public interest in his views 
• Associate Professor of Law, Western New England College School of Law. B.A., 
Cornell University, 1983; J.D., Boston University School of Law, 1986; LL.M., Boston 
University School of Law, 1990. The author thanks Jay Mootz and Elizabeth Lovejoy 
for their insightful comments on earlier drafts of this Review. 
I See, e.g., STEPHEN G. BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM (1982) [hereinafter 
BREYER, REGULATION]; STEPHEN G. BREYER & RICHARD B. STEWART, ADMINISTRA-
TIVE LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY: PROBLEMS, TEXT AND CASES (3d ed. 1992); 
Stephen G. Breyer, Analyzing Regulatory Failure: Mismatches, Less Restrictive Alter-
natives, and Reform, 92 HARV. L. REv. 547 (1979); Stephen G. Breyer, Antitrust, 
Deregulation, and the Newly Liberated Marketplace, 75 CAL. L. REv. 1005 (1987). 
2STEPHEN G. BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE: TOWARD EFFECTIVE RISK 
REGULATION (1993) [hereinafter BREYER]. 
3 Justice Breyer has an impressive resume. He studied at Stanford, Oxford, and 
Harvard Law School; clerked for Justice Goldberg of the Supreme Court; and served 
on the Harvard Law School faculty. He has held several positions in Washington: in 
1973 he served on the Watergate prosecution team; in 1974-75 he was a special counsel 
to the Senate Judiciary Committee Subcommittee on Administrative Practices; and in 
1979-80 he served as counsel to the Senate Judiciary Committee. Breyer was appointed 
to the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in 1981, elevated to Chief 
Judge of that court in 1990, and ultimately appointed to the United States Supreme 
Court in 1994. For a tidy summary of his professional accomplishments, see David 
Margolick, Man in the News: The Supreme Court; Scholarly Consensus Builder: 
Stephen Gerald Breyer, N.Y. TIMES, May 14, 1994, at AI; and Paul M. Barrett, High 
Court Choice Is Strong Thinker Who Offers Something for Everyone, No Distinct 
Agenda, WALL ST. J., May 16, 1994, at A20. 
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on regulation. Whether expert or layman, anyone alarmed by the 
current state of the regulatory process and concerned with pros-
pects for its improvement will find that Justice Breyer's ideas 
and observations merit serious consideration. Fortunately, Justice 
Breyer has written an exceptionally accessible book. 
The book says much more about the regulatory process gen-
erally than its title suggests. While it certainly can stand on its 
own as an analysis of health and safety regulation, the book's 
true significance lies in the warnings it sounds concerning the 
regulatory process in general. Although Breyer's earlier work 
regarded "generic" approaches to regulatory reform with suspi-
cion and argued instead that reform should proceed on a "step 
by step, program by program" basis,4 much of the discussion in 
Breaking the Vicious Circle is generic in the sense that it can be 
applied to substantive areas other than health and safety regula-
tion without losing much in translation. Thus, with his current 
extrapolation from the specific example of risk regulation to 
regulation generally, Justice Breyer sees himself following the 
admonition of Oliver Wendell Holmes "to look for the 'general' 
in the 'particular."'5 
With characteristically clear insight, Justice Breyer identifies 
several systemic problems that plague the regulatory process in 
the United States. He discusses how public (mis)perceptions, 
congressional (over)reaction, and technical (un)certainty create 
a "vicious circle" that increasingly undermines the legitimacy of 
the regulatory process. However, Breyer does more than merely 
criticize from the sidelines. He presents a thought-provoking 
proposal for the reform of the regulatory process that deserves 
full and fair consideration.6 
This Review outlines the systemic problems and the "vicious 
circle" identified by Justice Breyer and then proceeds to review 
his proposed solution. The final part presents several criticisms 
of his proposal and concludes that, while Breyer's modest sug-
gestions may help at the margin, they settle for tinkering with 
the system instead of giving it the overhaul it really needs. 
4 BREYER, REGULATION, supra note I, at 34l. 
5 BREYER, supra note 2, at ix. 
6 See BREYER, supra note 2, at 59-61; see also infra notes 34-46 and accompanying 
text. 
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I. SYSTEMIC PROBLEMS AND THE VICIOUS CIRCLE 
In the first section of his book, Justice Breyer describes three 
pervasive problems that plague the regulatory system. Using apt, 
real-world illustrations, Justice Breyer identifies and discusses 
what he calls the "tunnel vision" or "last 10 percent" problem,7 
the "random agenda" problem,s and the "inconsistency" prob-
lem.9 
The first of these problems, the "tunnel vision" or "last 10 
percent" problem, arises when regulators, either through their 
own zeal or because they are carrying out a legislative directive, 
seek to eradicate a given hazard entirely, even though cleaning 
up the "last" ten percent is inordinately expensive compared to 
the increase in public safety it provides.lo Essentially, the prob-
lem is that regulators do not know when to stop. Using fitting 
examples from the regulation of polychlorinatedbiphenyls, as-
bestos, and benzene, Justice Breyer shows how targeting the last 
ten percent not only costs too much, but might even create more 
safety hazards than it cures.u 
Breyer next identifies what he calls the "random agenda" 
problem.l2 In examining some of the hazards the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) has chosen to target, he finds that the 
agency's regulatory priorities are not determined by detached 
experts who carefully spend scarce resources to get the greatest 
benefit at the lowest cost. Instead, the agency's agenda is often 
driven by public fears, politics, history, and even chance. l3 Thus, 
7 BREYER, supra note 2, at 11-19. 
81d. at 19-21. 
91d. at 21-28. 
101d. at 11. 
11 ld. at 12-15. For example, "cleaning up" asbestos in public buildings causes 
asbestos fibers that would have remained harmlessly in place to become airborne, 
increasing significantly the chance of those fibers lodging in workers' lungs and 
creating medical problems. ld. at 12. 
121d. at 19. Breyer's concern with agendas comports with the concern of other 
scholars who have studied the role of agendas in the legislative and regulatory process. 
The control of agendas can have a profound impact on the outcome of the policy 
process. See generally DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC 
CHOICE: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION 38-42 (1991); SHAUN H. HEAP ET AL., THE 
THEORY OF CHOICE: A CRITICAL GUIDE 249-58 (1992); Kenneth A. Shepsle, Prospects 
for Formal Models of Legislatures, 10 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 5 (1985); Barbara Sinclair, 
Agenda Control and Policy Success: Ronald Reagan and the 97th House, 10 LEGIS. 
STUD. Q. 291 (1985). 
13 BREYER supra note 2, at 20. Consistent with Justice Breyer's anecdotal reports on 
the hazardous substance regulatory agenda, an empirical study examining the EPA's 
rulemaking agenda concluded that pressure from Congress "distorts priorities and 
prevents realistic agenda setting and deadline compliance." Steven J. Groseclose, 
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not only does the agenda fail to address the problems that ex-
perts consider the most serious, but the problems that it does 
address change with the political winds. For example, the agenda 
reflects the public's obsession with cancer to the exclusion of 
other serious maladies, such as neurological damage. 14 
The third systemic ill that Justice Breyer identifies is the "in-
consistency" problem that results from the lack of coordination 
among the many agencies and experts whose efforts are brought 
to bear on a particular issue. IS In the area of hazardous material 
regulation, for instance, the EPA found chlorofluorocarbons 
(CFCs) to be a hazardous substance. That determination, and the 
consequent threat of liability under the Comprehensive Environ-
mental Response, Compensation, and Liability ActI6 (CERCLA), 
severely undermined the efforts of the EPA's Office of Air and 
Radiation to encourage the recycling of refrigerators because 
few recycling companies wanted to assume the potential liability 
of a CERCLA clean-upP While the EPA classified CFCs as haz-
ardous, the Food and Dmg Administration (FDA) continued to 
condone the use of CFCs in asthma inhalers. IS The widely dis-
parate treatment of CFCs by different branches of the EPA and 
between the EPA and the FDA sent confusing messages to the 
public. 
In the second section of the book, Justice Breyer explores the 
role played by these systemic problems in the "vicious circle" 
that is created by the complex interaction of public perceptions, 
congressional reaction, and uncertainties in the technical regula-
tory process. I9 The public's perception of problems starts the 
vicious circle in motion. Justice Breyer describes how the public 
frequently misperceives the gravity of risks because, as Oliver 
Wendell Holmes observed, "most people think dramatically, not 
quantitatively."20 As a result of sloppy thinking, the public con-
Reinventing the Regulatory Agenda: Conclusions From an Empirical Study of EPA's 
Clean Air Act Rulemaking Progress Projections, 53 MD. L. REV. 521, 533 (1994). 
14 BREYER, supra note 2, at 20. 
IS ld. at 21-28. 
16 Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980, 
Pub. Law No. 96-510,94 Stat. 2767 (1980), as amended by the Superfund Amendments 
and Reauthorization Act of 1986, Pub. Law No. 99-499, 100 Stat 1613 (1986) (codified 
as 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988 & Supp. 1993). 
17 BREYER, supra note 2, at 22. 
ISld. 
191d. at 33-51. 
20ld. at 37. Breyer catalogs several factors that tend to confuse the public and cause 
them to reach incorrect conclusions, including the use of rules of thumb, overreaction 
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sistently overestimates the risk of certain hazards, such as get-
ting cancer, and underestimates the risk of other hazards, such 
as contracting tuberculosis.21 In the public's mind, the absolute 
regulation of risks that are perceived to be great (though they 
are actually remote) takes precedence over the regulation of 
truly serious risks that are not as well-known. 
The vicious circle continues when the public communicates 
its fears and concerns to Congress.22 In Breyer's view, Congress 
contributes to the vicious circle by responding to public percep-
tions of risk with detailed statutes. These statutes appear to give 
discretion to agencies but actually tie their hands and prevent 
flexible responses to the public's perceived "problem."23 While 
there may be political reasons for Congress to act in this man-
ner,24 Breyer believes that Congress is poorly suited to the task 
of writing specific regulatory language because, for various struc-
tural and political reasons,25 it cannot take a coherent view of 
the various problems it considers.26 
to prominent or sensational news, protective feelings for family and friends, inability 
to differentiate between conflicting expert opinions, preconceived opinions, and math 
anxiety. Id. at 35-37. His list certainly is not exhaustive. He could have added to it 
other basic analytical infirmities of the general public such as: lack of basic reading 
skills, see IRWIN S. KIRSCH ET AL., NATIONAL CENTER FOR EDUCATION STATISTICS, 
ADULT LITERACY IN AMERICA (1993); inability or unwillingness to process data that 
has been disclosed, see William N. Eskridge, Jr., One Hundred Years of Ineptitude: The 
Need for Mortgage Rules Consonant with the Economic and Psychological Dynamics 
of the Home Sale and Loan Transaction, 70 VA. L. REV. 1083, 1112-18 (1984); and 
susceptibility to "information overload," see Jeff Sovern, Toward a Theory of Warran-
ties in Sales of New Homes: Housing the Implied Warranty Advocates, Law and 
Economics Mavens, and Consumer Psychologists Under One Roof, 1993 WIS. L. REv. 
13, 27-30 (1993). 
21 BREYER, supra note 2, at 37. 
22Id. at 39-42. 
23Id. at 39-40. Helen Garten described a similar problem in federal banking regulation 
where congressional action has frequently impeded the efforts of regulators to fashion 
a coherent regulatory policy. See HELEN A. GARTEN, WHY BANK REGULATION FAILED: 
DESIGNING A BANK REGULATORY STRATEGY FOR THE 1990s (1991). 
24 Such political considerations might include congressional distrust of the executive 
branch to carry out a broadly worded statute or congressional desire to take political 
credit for a "tough" law. BREYER, supra note 2, at 41-42. 
25For example, because Congress typically enacts one statute at a time, it rarely 
considers an entire regulatory program at once. In addition, bills originate in different 
committees, many of which have overlapping jurisdiction. Committees may also have 
radically different ideas about what should be addressed and how. Finally, Congress's 
need to reflect and respond to public opinion makes it a poor candidate for establishing 
a rational regulatory agenda, given the public's difficulty with understanding risks. Id. 
at 42. 
26Id. Regarding the structural deficiencies of Congress in addressing regulatory 
matters, see also Eric J. Gouvin, Truth in Savings and The Failure of Legislative 
Methodology, 62 U. CIN. L. REV. 1281 (1994); Edward L. Rubin, Legislative Method-
ology: Some Lessons from the Truth-in-Lending Act, 80 GEO. L.J. 233 (1991). 
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Congress probably plays an even greater role in Breyer's vi-
cious circle than he acknowledges. While Breyer sees the insti-
tution as merely reflecting misguided public notions, Congress 
itself is at least as great a source of misinformation and misper-
ceptions as the public at large. It seems only fair to assume that 
members of Congress are subject to the same analytical weak-
nesses as the public when it comes to risk perception. Because 
so much legislation begins in congressional offices and does not 
in fact spring from a great public outcry, the misperceptions of 
members of Congress, not their constituents, may become en-
shrined in the law.27 If that is the case, then the vicious circle 
may begin and end in Congress, and public perception is either 
a mere adjunct to the process or a handy and easily manipulable 
rationalization of congressional action. Breyer fails to consider 
this possibility. 
After Congress has acted, the vicious circle rolls into the 
realm of the regulatory agencies. In Breyer's view, the inherent 
uncertainty in the technical aspects of substantive regulation 
provides the last element of the vicious circle.28 Different agen-
cies (and even different departments within the same agency) 
approach similar problems from different directions leading to 
the formulation of inconsistent policies. 
In part, uncertainty and inconsistency are a function of the 
many different disciplines that can be brought to bear on a 
particular problem. As an example, Breyer cites the enormously 
complex task of assessing a hazardous waste site: "A waste site 
evaluation ... may require knowledge of toxicology, epidemiol-
ogy, meteorology, hydrology, engineering, public health, trans-
portation and civil defense, disciplines with different histories, 
different methods of proceeding, and different basic assump-
tions."29 Different agencies, with different missions and different 
personnel who have jurisdiction over the same matter are bound 
to have different perspectives on the problem and prescribe dif-
ferent courses of action. 
Unfortunately, Congress and the public are looking for the 
solution-not a range of possible approaches to the problem. 
27For example, when Congress passed Truth-in-Savings legislation, the bill's chief 
sponsor, Rep. Lehman, admitted that the impetus for the bill was a personal reaction 
to what he perceived to be a misleading advertisement. Gouvin, supra note 26, at 1321 
n.160. 
28 BREYER, supra note 2, at 42-50. 
29 [d. at 43. 
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Asking regulators to establish the solution to a problem, how-
ever, is somewhat unrealistic. Because the "solution" depends to 
a great extent on the theoretical lens one chooses to look through, 
different regulators looking at the same phenomenon through 
different lenses will make inconsistent policy. Those inconsistent 
policies, while based on theoretically sound premises, will tend 
to suggest to the public and Congress that the regulators are 
hopelessly muddled and do not know how to respond to the 
problem. 
While different theoretical approaches to similar problems cause 
some inconsistency in the regulatory process, other technical 
matters also play a role in making the regulatory scheme appear 
irrational. For example, all regulators must take action without 
complete information. In the face of incomplete information, 
regulators must rely on assumptions. Assumptions do not always 
derive from scientific principles, but might result from political 
considerations.30 Reliance on conflicting assumptions causes dif-
ferent agencies to reach different conclusions and produce a 
regulatory scheme that appears irrational. As an obvious exam-
ple, an agency guided by the principle that all policy should "err 
on the safe side" will almost always reach a different conclusion 
from an agency that scrutinizes the bottom line for demonstrable 
"cost effectiveness." 
These three elements-public perception, congressional ac-
tion, and technical uncertainty-make up Breyer's vicious circle. 
The vicious circle creates the systemic problems that plague it: 
tunnel vision, irrational agendas, and inconsistency. The ele-
ments of the vicious circle reinforce each other and lead to 
public distrust of the regulatory process, which results in greater 
political oversight, which aggravates the random agenda prob-
lem and in tum creates more inconsistent outcomes. Taken as a 
whole, the regulatory process undermines its own legitimacy.31 
While Breyer's treatment of the interrelation of the systemic 
problems and the elements of the vicious circle is somewhat 
sketchy,32 the overall scheme nevertheless appears intuitively at-
tractive and commonsensical.33 
30ld. at 49. 
311d. at 50-51. 
321d. In Justice Breyer's defense, the book was derived from a series of lectures, so 
one might expect a certain degree of brevity. 
33While Justice Breyer's observations are anecdotal, many of the problems he 
identifies have also been identified by the National Performance Review after intensive 
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II. JUSTICE BREYER'S SOLUTION 
Justice Breyer's proposal for breaking the vicious circle fo-
cuses on the behavior of regulatory agencies. He targets the 
agencies because, in his words, "any practical, institutionally 
oriented solution must also take account of the extreme difficulty 
of changing human psychology, press reactions, or Congres-
sional politics."34 Apparently, he sees the regulatory agencies as 
being somewhat amenable to change, and suggests structural 
modifications in the way regulations are developed that will help 
bring about "self-reinforcing institutional change, which will 
gradually build confidence in the regulatory system."35 
To break the vicious circle, Justice Breyer proposes the crea-
tion of an elite, politically insulated group of "super-regulators" 
within the executive branch. These super-regulators would be 
given interagency jurisdiction and the authority to implement 
substantive changes with the aim of achieving the "mission of 
building an improved, coherent [regulatory scheme] ... ; of 
helping to create priorities within as well as among programs; 
and . . . [ot] comparing programs to determine how better to 
allocate resources . . . ."36 The super-regulators chosen to carry 
out this function would be drawn from a new, special, prestig-
ious civil service career path. They would be groomed for this 
service by rotation through assignments on Capitol Hill, the 
administrative agencies, and the Office of Management and Budget 
(OMB).37 
Although Breyer does not see these structural changes as a 
cure-all for the regulatory woes he describes in his book, he does 
believe the proposal represents a "constructive approach."38 If 
the goal is to make regulation better, as opposed to making it 
"right," Breyer's approach has great appeal. 
field work, research, and interviews. See generally Jeffrey S. Lubbers, Better Regula. 
tions: The National Performance Review's Reglliatory Reform Recommendations, 1994 
DUKE L.J. 1165 (1994). . 
34BREYER, sllpra note 2, at 55 (citation omitted). 
35 [d. 
36 [d. at 60-61. See also Robert A. Katzmann, Wayne Morse Forum, November 10, 
1992: Have We Lost the Ability to Govern? The Challenge of Making Public Policy, 
72 OR. L. REV. 231, 240 (1993) (making a similar suggestion for the creation of a 
function within the Office of Management and Budget to resolve conflicts and establish 
priorities among various policies). 
37 [d. at 59-60. 
38 [d. at 59. 
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While the creation of an elite institutional body within the 
federal government with the authority to set regulatory policy 
priorities and allocate resources accordingly would be a new 
approach (especially during peacetime),39 the idea has a distin-
guished pedigree. Breyer's idea may first remind one of Plato's 
Republic, in which an elite group of philosophers are specially 
groomed to govern.40 In Breyer's scheme, however, the guardians 
must share political power with Congress, so it is not quite as 
undemocratic as the republic envisioned by Plato. 
More recently, John Stuart Mill suggested that technical rules, 
be they laws or regulations, ought to be made by persons with 
special understanding and expertise.41 Mill proposed a "Commis-
sion on Legislation" that would assist Parliament in making 
public policy.42 In the early twentieth century, Woodrow Wilson 
proposed the creation of institutional structures to move public 
policy out of Congress and into a body that could act more 
rationally.43 Even more recently, Professor Cass Sunstein has 
recommended the creation of such a body in either the legisla-
tive or executive branches to coordinate and rationalize regula-
tion.44 
Not only has this idea been proposed before, it has been 
implemented to some degree. In France, for example, the Con-
seil d'Etat performs a function in the coordination of agency 
work which is similar to the role Breyer foresees for the super-
regulators.45 In fact, even in this country Breyer's proposal is no 
longer strictly theoretical since the National Performance Re-
view has endorsed, and President Clinton has implemented, a 
Regulatory Working Group to be chaired by an OMB adminis-
trator.46 
39 During World War I and World War II, the federal government exercised general 
control over economic resource allocation and production priorities. See generally 
DAVID BRINKLEY, WASHINGTON GOES TO WAR 50-82 (1988). 
40PLATO, THE REpUBLIC OF PLATO (Allan Bloom trans., 1968). 
41JOHN STUART MILL, CONSIDERATIONS ON REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 237-39 
(H.B. Acton ed., 1972) (1861). 
42Id. 
43See Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 
94 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 45 (1994) (providing an historical inquiry into the respective 
roles of Congress, the executive branch and the administrative agencies). 
44 CASS R. SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RiGHTS REVOLUTION: RECONCEIVING THE REGU-
LATORY STATE 108 (1990). 
4sBREYER, supra note 2, at 70-71. 
46Lubbers, supra note 33, at 1170. 
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III. CRITICISMS OF THE PROPOSAL 
Justice Breyer does not pretend that his proposal is a panacea 
that will correct all of the ills facing the regulatory process.47 
Even with that disclaimer, his proposal raises at least four seri-
ous concerns that call its value into question: it ignores the body 
of work developed by public choice scholars; it transplants ex-
isting problems; it accepts pervasive regulation without seriously 
considering deregulation as an alternative; and it attempts to 
correct the regulatory problem too late in the process. 
A. Public Choice 
The coherence and intuitive appeal of Justice Breyer's pro-
posal rest on the unstated assumption that regulators serve the 
public interest.48 Justice Breyer seems to adopt a neo-republican 
outlook in which civic-minded public servants act in the public 
interest. However, not everyone shares his optimism that govern-
ment actors, no matter how "elite," will be immune to the forces 
described in the public choice literature.49 
Implicit in the book's approach to the subject is the idea that 
the regulatory scheme is broken but fixable or, in other words, 
the incoherent results produced by the system are avoidable. 
Public choice scholars, on the other hand, contend that the whole 
exercise is doomed to produce incoherent results regardless of 
the structure of the process.50 While arguing that the system has 
47BREYER, supra note 2, at 59. 
48Breyer indirectly suggests this idea when he assumes that his scheme will be 
adopted by a government composed of "honest, talented, and qualified" regulators. Id. 
at 59. 
49 Jonathan Macey, for example, would likely find that Breyer's formula misses "an 
appreciation of the frightening power of man to subvert the offices of government for 
what can only be described as evil ends." Jonathan R. Macey, The Missing Element in 
the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1673 (1988). 
so Summarizing the public choice literature in a footnote is a task doomed to failure. 
The scholars who make up the public choice school are a somewhat loosely knit group. 
Their perspectives on the law draw heavily on economics, game theory, organizational 
behavior and political science. See FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note 12, at 21-33; Jerry 
L. Mashaw, The Economics of Politics and the Understanding of Public Law, 65 
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 123, 143 (1989); see generally, Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. 
Frickey, The Jurisprndence of Public Choice, 65 TEx. L. REV. 873, 878-79, 883, 
901-06 (1987) (stating a general theory of "public choice" is impossible, since there 
are many variations on the set of core principles that have inspired many of the 
scholars). As a general proposition, however, a public choice scholar is likely to see 
statutes and regulations as products that are bought and sold in economic markets. For 
an overview, see Robert D. Tollison, Public Choice and Legislation, 74 VA. L. REV. 
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reached its current state because of the bureaucratic failure to 
make rational policy analysis, Justice Breyer makes no attempt 
to address any anticipated criticisms from the public choice 
school.5l He completely ignores the possibility that the system 
has evolved into its current state as a result of an intricate web 
of deals, concessions and paybacks bought and sold in the leg-
islative marketplace by interested actors. Others have eloquently 
attacked the public choice position.52 Justice ;Breyer weakens his 
proposal by not adding his voice to the chorus. 
B. Transplantation of Problems 
Justice Breyer believes his proposal has appeal because it 
draws upon the "virtues of bureaucracy" and builds on what he 
sees as the traditional strengths of administrative agencies-es-
sentially, their ability to rationalize policy, expertise and politi-
cal insulation, combined with their authority to carry out the 
339 (1988). A significant school of thought within the movement owes much to the 
work of Kenneth Arrow, who developed the famous theorem that bears his name. 
Arrow's Theorem holds that under certain conditions it is impossible to aggregate the 
preferences of a given group because the way in which voting is conducted could result 
in an infinite cycling of choices. For a useful summary of Arrow's Theorem and its 
larger implications, see HEAP, supra note 12, at 209-15. Given the theoretical problems 
of aggregating preferences, the output of collective bodies tends to be incoherent. 
51 Breyer's earlier important book on regulatory reform was also criticized for ignoring 
the perspectives of the public choice literature. Ernest Gellhorn, Rationalizing Regula-
tory Reform, 81 MICH. L. REV. 1033, 1036-37 (1983) (reviewing BREYER, REGULA-
TION, supra note 1. 
52 Scholars have attacked the public choice position on the grounds that it lacks 
empirical support. See, e.g., Janet M. Grenzke, PACs and the Congressional Supermar-
ket: The Currency is Complex, 33 AM. J. POL. SCI. 1 (1989) reprinted in THE CONGRESS 
OF THE UNITED STATES, 1789-1989, vol. 8,689 (Joel Silbey ed., 1991); Mark Kelman, 
On Democracy-Bashing: A Skeptical Look at the Theoretical and "Empirical" Practice 
of the Public Choice Movement, 74 VA. L. REV. 199, 236-68 (1988). Other scholars 
have criticized the methodology of the public choice approach for failing to give weight 
to legitimate concerns about the public interest that legislators may have and instead 
constructing an ex post explanation for legislative behavior based on who benefitted 
from the legislation. See, e.g., Donald C. Langevoort, Statutory Obsolescence and the 
Judicial Process: The Revisionist Role of the Courts in Federal Banking Regulation, 
85 MICH. L. REV. 672, 692 (1987); Edward L. Rubin, Beyond Public Choice: Compre-
hensive Rationality in the Writing and Reading of Statutes, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1,5-30 
(1992). In addition, many scholars have questioned whether a world view dominated 
by interest groups and excluding higher values runs the risk of becoming morally 
impoverished and ultimately politically illegitimate. See, e.g., Farber & Frickey, supra 
note 50, at 906-07; Daniel A. Farber, Democracy and Disgust: Reflections on Public 
Choice, 65 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 161 (1989); Geoffrey Brennan & James M. Buchanan, 
Is Public Choice Immoral? The Case for the "Nobel" Lie, 74 VA. L. REV. 179, 180 
(1988) (describing this criticism). 
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policy.53 Ironically, Breyer's reliance on the system's perceived 
strengths prevents his proposal from escaping the system's fun-
damental problems. These systemic flaws will merely manifest 
themselves in a different forum. 
1. Rationalization 
Hopes for a coherently rationalized regulatory scheme may 
prove difficult to realize. As Breyer himself points out, the EPA, 
which has a single head, sometimes ends up working at cross-
purposes with itself.54 Although agency heads are unable to ra-
tionalize their own agency's agenda, Breyer believes the new 
cadre of super-regulators will be able to draft a specific regula-
tory agenda for all agencies with little difficulty. Breyer con-
tends the super-regulators will rationalize the agenda partly by 
"mak[ing] explicit, and more uniform, controversial assumptions 
that agencies now, implicitly and often inconsistently, use in 
reaching their decisions."55 
While such a rationalization scheme might be possible, it will 
only be accomplished if agencies defer to the particular theoreti-
cal position held by the super-regulator. This rationalization will 
not harmonize the different perspectives; rather, it will choose 
one perspective over another. By necessity, the super-regUlators 
will have to adopt some theoretical point of view when analyz-
ing regulatory issues. For instance, by taking the point of view 
of an economist over the point of view of an environmentalist, 
the super-regulators will produce different substantive regula-
tions and agendas for regulatory action. However, the underlying 
normative foundations of the economist and the environmentalist 
are fundamentally different and incommensurable. Asking the 
super-regulator to reconcile them and come up with "the" solu-
tion to a particular regulatory problem is impossible because the 
different values of these disparate disciplines cannot be judged 
by a common measure.56 Any solution the regulator reaches will 
53 BREYER, supra note 2, at 61-63. 
54See supra notes 15-18 and accompanying text; BREYER, supra note 2, at 22. 
55 BREYER, supra note 2, at 64-65. 
56Por a discussion of the myriad problems involved in attempting to deal with 
conflicting values in the law, see Cass R. Sunstein, Incommensllrability alld Valuatioll 
ill Law, 92 MICH. L. REv. 779 (1994). 
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necessarily be informed by a world view that embraces some 
values and rejects others. 
The result will be a consistent agenda, but it may be an agenda 
that fails to support the particular missions of particular agen-
cies. When agencies charged with protecting the environment, 
for instance, are seen as failing to advocate the position of their 
"clients," political consequences will follow. In addition, the 
consistency provided by the super-regulator will last only as 
long as the super-regulator holds her post. When the regulators 
change, the agency's values will change along with its underly-
ing substantive policies. The impermanent nature of super-regu-
lators' tenure may not be entirely unappealing since policy changes 
at least will be made by someone intimately familiar with the 
entire regulatory scheme. Even so, the scheme is a far cry from 
the happy situation Justice Breyer envisions. 
2. Expertise 
The expertise argument in favor of administrative agency author-
ity has paled in light of attacks that agencies are not especially 
expert. The idea of an all-knowing expert who can objectively 
perform a rational assessment and produce an objectively "right" 
answer seems somewhat naiveY On the other hand, if Breyer's 
super-regulator idea could be implemented, it certainly would 
create a group of experts who know not only the substantive 
regulations, but also the workings of the various branches of 
government. Such a group of knowledgeable career civil ser-
vants could be a valuable resource for writing more intelligent 
regulations. 
By utilizing experts in the creation of the regulatory product, 
Justice Breyer's proposal has been heralded as a possible way 
to incorporate "total quality management" ideas from industry 
into the design of government regulation. 58 The creation of a 
highly trained and respected group of professional super-regulators 
could go a long way toward injecting quality into the regulatory 
57 See THOMAS O. McGARITY, REINVENTING RATIONALITY: THE ROLE OF REGULA-
TORY ANALYSIS IN THE FEDERAL BUREAUCRACY at xvi (1991) (observing that "data 
analysis is expensive, cost and benefit assessment models are inaccurate, biases can 
subtly creep into 'objective' analyses, and the uncertainties are sometimes so huge and 
pervasive as to render the idea of objectivity virtually meaningless"). 
58 Paul R. VerkuiI, Reverse Yardstick Competition: A New Deal for the Nineties, 45 
FLA. L. REV. 1, 16 (1993). 
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design process, representing a vast improvement over the current 
practice of checking for quality after the fact. 59 Just as industry 
has found that after-the-fact quality checks are a poor way to 
insure a quality product, government attempts at after-the-fact 
quality control-such as sunset provisions, law revision commis-
sions, judicial review and congressional oversight-have met 
with poor results.60 
Yet experts are not immune to sloppy thinking, zealotry, or 
incompetence. Even a super-regulator could fall victim to the 
"last 10% problem," especially if, as contemplated by Justice 
Breyer, the super-regulator's entire professional experience is in 
government and has not been tempered by the realities of indus-
try. Perhaps the super-regulator career path should require a stint 
in the private sector instead of allowing a regulator to rule su-
preme with only inside-the-beltway experience to inform her 
world view. Without a reality check, a super-regulator produced 
in accordance with Breyer's new career path might nevertheless 
be the kind of regulatory zealot who spends $1,000 to get a $1 
benefit. 
In addition, expert regulators might nevertheless be suscepti-
ble to the same analytical infirmities as mere mortals. While 
Breyer correctly points out that "framing effects" often cause the 
general public to make poor decisions,61 he fails to note that 
research has found that framing effects warp the judgments of 
highly educated professional decisionmakers as well.62 Framing 
effects have been called the linguistic or logical equivalent of 
optical illusions because they make the perceiver see something 
S9 See E. Donald Elliott, TQM-ing OMB: Or Why Regulatory Review U1lder Execlltive 
Order ]2,291 Works Poorly and What President Clinton Should Do about It, 57 LAW 
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 167 (1994) (advocating changes in the regulatory review process 
that would incorporate "total quality management" concepts from industry and focus 
regulatory review efforts on the beginning, not the end, of the agency rule-making 
process). Ultimately, the process would create knowledgeable agency bureaucrats who 
would be able substantially to internalize the regulatory review regime. 
60 Breyer's earlier work reveals his lack of faith in post-enactment review to bring 
about meaningful reform ofregulation. BREYER, REGULATION, supra note 1, at 365-66. 
For a general discussion of several methods of post-enactment review and their 
shortcomings, see Gouvin, supra note 26, at 1364-70. 
61 The way in which a question is asked often influences the answer that will be 
given. This is called the framing effect. Breyer analyzes framing effects as a subset of 
mathematics anxiety, but it reaches beyond math problems. BREYER, supra note 2, at 
36-37. 
62 See HEAP, supra note 12, at 39-40 (describing a famous framing effects experiment 
on the choice of treatment regimes for cancer patients and finding that both patients 
and their doctors made the same analytical mistakes based on framing effects). 
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that is not there.63 Putting an expert in the role of decisionmaker 
does not make these effects go away. 
Similarly, while Breyer points out that the general public can 
become befuddled by expert opinions,64 he offers no evidence 
that expert decision-makers are not likewise subject to the same 
confusion. As anyone who has ever had to arrange for expert 
witnesses in a trial knows, there are experts on both sides of 
every issue. The experts can apply acceptable research tech-
niques to a given problem and come up with very different 
conclusions and recommendations. In the end, someone has to 
choose between two supportable positions. There is no way for 
an expert decisionmaker to know if one consulting expert is 
"right" and the other "wrong" in any meaningful sense.65 
3. Political Insulation 
In his previous work, one of Breyer's great strengths was his 
realistic understanding of political forces and the role they play 
in any congressional action.66 In Breaking the Vicious Circle, 
however, Breyer's political antennae seem less finely tuned. His 
proposal for a super-regulator clearly invites criticism that it is 
undemocratic, elitist and otherwise politically unacceptable. Al-
though Breyer briefly responds to each of these anticipated criti-
cisms, he does so somewhat cryptically.67 The book needs a 
stronger defense of its position against those who maintain that 
Congress has already delegated too much authority to agencies 
without sufficient accountability.68 Breyer could have written such 
a defense since the way the proposal provides for political insu-
lation is its greatest strength. Insulation could allow the super-
regulators to make decisions that politically accountable authori-
ties never would be able to pull off. In fact, Congress has resorted 
63 Richard L. Hasen, Comment, Efficiency Under Informational Asymmetry: The 
Effect of Framing on Legal Rules, 38 UCLA L. REV. 391, 399 (1990). 
64 BREYER, supra note 2, at 36. 
65 The public debate over disposable diapers provides an excellent example of the 
battle of experts in the public policy arena. See Cynthia Crossen, How 'Tactical 
Research'Muddied Diaper Debate, WALL ST. J., May 17, 1994, at Bl. 
66Louis B. Schwartz, Book Review, 35 HASTINGS L.J. 233, 237 (1983) (reviewing 
BREYER, REGULATION, supra note 1). 
67BREYER, supra note 2, at 72-79. 
68 See, e.g., DAVID SCHOENBROD, POWER WITHOUT RESPONSIBILITY (1993); but cf. 
Peter L. Strauss, Legislative Theory and the Rule of Law: Some Comments on Rubin, 
89 COLUM. L. REV. 427 (1989). 
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to such undemocratic methods in the past precisely to break the 
stranglehold of political forces. 69 
Unfortunately, the benefits of depoliticization come with a seri-
ous cost. If the regulatory process is not completely depoliticized, 
then some actors will continue to have access to the process and 
shape it to their needs while others will be locked out. The 
prospect that super-regulators will be truly insulated from poli-
tics is remote. Breyer .himself does not believe appointments that 
touch the political process can ever escape the taint of politics. 
For example, in Regulation and Its Reform he recognized the 
inherently political nature of the appointments process and the 
generally negative effects it has on the quality of regulation.70 
Although Breyer's super-regulators will be career civil servants 
and therefore less susceptible to political forces than appointees, 
they nevertheless will be buffeted by political forces. In the end, 
some argue, if the process cannot be completely and evenly 
depoliticized, it perhaps should not be depoliticized at all.71 
4. Authority 
Even with a super-regulator, the laws passed by Congress will 
remain the law of the land. If a super-regulator identifies an 
inconsistency between the law as written and the perceived risk 
it addresses (in the terms of Breyer's earlier writings, a regula-
tory "mismatch"), the regulator nevertheless will be bound by 
the law. Only Congress can weed out the inconsistent statutes 
and implement sufficiently flexible laws that would allow a su-
per-regulator to reach his full potential. Relying on Congress to 
pass such laws, however, dooms the project to failure. Congress 
struggles to deal with even relatively simple problems in a ra-
tional, coherent manner.72 If the regulatory scheme is so dis-
69 Warren Weaver, Jr., New Panel Asked on Social Secllrity, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7, 1981, 
at A8; see, Michael A. Fitts, Can Ignorance Be Bliss? Imperfect I1lformatio1l as a 
Positive Inflllence in Political Institlltions, 88 MICH. L. REV. 917, 952-53 (1990) 
(suggesting that the success of the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission 
and other ad hoc national commissions has been due, at least in part, to the fact that 
the commission structure allows the creation of an informal bargaining mechanism 
outside of the public eye). As another example, Congress effectively foreclosed 
unmitigated political bickering over Social Security reform in the eady 1980s by 
forming the National Commission on Social Security Reform. 
70 BREYER, REGULATION, sllpra note I, at 343-45. 
71 David A. Dana, Setting Environmental Priorities: The Promise of a Bureaucratic 
Soilltion, 74 B.U. L. REV. 365, 373-85 (1994) (reviewing BREYER, supra note 2). 
72See Gouvin, sllpra note 26 (analyzing Congress' failure to address the problems 
raised by the proponents of Truth-in-Savings legislation). 
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jointed and confused as to require an apolitical super-regulator 
to straighten it out, the legislative enactments necessary to im-
plement that scheme will also be fraught with political deals and 
brinksmanship. 
c. Failure to Consider Alternatives 
Despite his earlier passion for designing a regulatory system 
that consciously analyzes available alternatives,73 Justice Breyer 
seems to discard them completely in his current proposal. He 
seems to assume the underlying necessity for regulation and 
pays short shrift to the idea of deregulation. This position comes 
as somewhat of a surprise given Breyer's eloquent discussion of 
deregulation of the airline industry in Regulation and Its Reform. 
There, he was skeptical of the idea that regulation was the best 
response for every problem.74 At that time Breyer believed that 
"classical regulation ought to be looked upon as a weapon of 
last resort,"75 and should be used only where less restrictive 
methods will not work. 76 
Breaking the Vicious Circle, on the other hand, seems to ac-
cept the inevitability of a pervasive regulatory scheme-at least 
for hazardous substances regulation. Breyer simply dismisses 
deregulation in one paragraph, labelling it a "non-solution."77 In 
doing so, Breyer chooses to ignore innovative programs for the 
regulation of hazardous wastes adopted in Texas and other states 
that scale back the government's role and incorporate a sig-
nificant measure of industry self-regulation.78 More generally, 
some scholars have convincingly argued that private actors can 
be regulated in the most responsive and flexible manner by 
creating incentives for these actors to comply with federal regu-
lations voluntarily, and that this method should be employed in 
73See BREYER, REGULATION, supra note 1, at 156-83. 
74 "Too often arguments made in favor of governmental regulation assume that 
regulation, at least in principle, is a perfect solution to any perceived problem with the 
unregulated marketplace." Id. at 5 (footnote omitted). 
75Id. at 185. 
76Id. 
77BREYER, supra note 2, at 56. 
78 See Mary Lenz, Environmentalists, Industry Both Praise Water Panel Chief, 
HOUSTON POST, May 18, 1992, at A9; Governor Announces Cleanup Plan, Program 
Aims to Cut State Pollution In Half, HOUSTON POST, Apr. 8, 1992, at A22 (describing 
the Clean Texas 2000 program). 
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more situations.79 Congress certainly appears to be listening to 
the voices calling for more flexible regulation.8o 
D. Too Little, Too Late 
Although Justice Breyer's prescription correctly identifies the 
structure of the regulatory process as the problem, the primary 
defect in his approach is that it does not go to the root of the 
problem. Unfortunately, he ultimately concludes that the sys-
temic problems may be meaningfully addressed by tinkering 
with the existing OMB review process.81 While the structure of 
this process clearly contributes to the problems of effective regu-
lation, by the time the regulatory mess reaches OMB, it has 
already proceeded too far down the wrong track. Any hope for 
effective regulatory refonn depends on pushing the review proc-
ess back to the inception of the legislative idea that gives rise to 
the regulatory scheme.82 A system that encourages Congress to 
get legislation "right" in the first place makes more sense than 
a system where regulatory mandarins are charged with rational-
izing inconsistent congressional directives. 
In this regard, the "high noon" structural reform proposed by 
Justice Breyer in Regulation and Its Reform makes more sense 
and would get the regulatory process off to a better start.83 Under 
that approach, executive branch commissions would be charged 
with the task of studying specific regulatory programs and re-
porting findings within a specified time-table. The commissions 
would have to undertake a broad review of the programs in light 
of other less restrictive alternatives. The recommendations of the 
executive commissions would then go to Congress, where the 
appropriate committees would consider them. If the congres-
sional committees did not act on the recommendations within 
one year, the recommendation would automatically come up for 
79lAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION: TRANSCENDING THE 
DEREGULATION DEBATE 101-32 (1992); CHARLES L. SCHULTZE, THE PUBLIC USE OF 
PRIVATE INTEREST 13 (1977). 
80 See Craig Gannett, Congress and the Reform of Risk Regulation, 107 HARV. L. 
REv. 2095, 2100-01 (1994) (reviewing BREYER, supra note 2) (citing Congress's 
passage of the Clean Air Act amendments in 1990 as evidence of a willingness to use 
new "regulatory tools informed by economics and sensitive to costs and benefits"). 
81 BREYER, supra note 2, at 71-72. 
82 For a general discussion of ways in which the legislative process might be modified 
to provide a feedback loop that would improve the quality of legislation, see Gouvin, 
supra note 26, at 1353-75. 
83BREYER, REGULATION, supra note 1, at 366. 
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a vote on the floor of each house of Congress. By starting the 
review process with a deliberate and thoughtful study, the high 
noon idea would encourage informed decisionmaking based on 
a coherent agenda-assuming the executive branch could put 
together such a thing. The adherence to strict timetables would 
tend to overcome legislative inertia.84 
If Breyer's high noon idea falls short, others have recom-
mended ways to make the legislative process more amenable to 
the promulgation of effective, rational and coherent laws. For 
instance, Professor Edward Rubin has suggested that Congress 
prevent members and staff from drafting statutory language until 
the issues and goals supposed to be addressed by the legislation 
have been identified with some specificity.85 
On a different tack, Professor Robert Seidman has suggested 
putting additional responsibilities on legislative drafters to jus-
tify their proposed bills with a comprehensive legislative memo-
randum. The memorandum would have to analyze the problem 
at which the legislation is aimed and show why the proposed 
solution is the best solution.86 
Finally, I have suggested the creation of an Office of Public 
Policy that would bring together existing policy analysis re-
sources in the Congress, such as the Congressional Research 
Service, General Accounting Office, Office of Technology As-
sessment and the Congressional Budget Office, and extend those 
analytical services to all important legislation. The Office of 
Public Policy would do nothing more than consciously identify 
the 'issues and the alternative approaches available for action. 
Adoption of a given course of action would remain a political 
decision for Congress.87 
Anyone of these pre-enactment reforms likely will do more 
to improve the regulatory product than the post-enactment dam-
84The high noon idea received mixed reviews from legal commentators. See Lloyd 
N. Cutler, Regulatory Mismatch and Its Cure, 96 HARV. L. REV. 545, 553 (1982) 
(reviewing BREYER, REGULATION, supra note 1); Ernest Gellhorn, Rationalizing Regu-
latory Reform, 81 MICH. L. REV. 1033, 1038 (1983) (reviewing BREYER, REGULATION, 
supra note 1) (criticizing the idea); see also Louis B. Schwartz, Book Review, 35 
HASTINGS L.J. 233, 235 (1983) (reviewing BREYER, REGULATION, supra note 1) 
(discussing the idea in generally positive terms). 
85 Rubin, supra note 26. 
86Robert B. Seidman, Justifying Legislation: A Pragmatic, Institutionalist Approach 
to the Memorandum of Law, Legislative Theory, and Practical Reason, 29 HARV. J. ON 
LEGIS. 1 (1992). 
87 Gouvin, supra note 26, at 1371-75. 
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age control proposed by Justice Breyer. While he senses that 
changing the congressional legislative process is difficult, he 
must recognize that it is not impossible. His proposal instead 
calls for Congress to relinquish some amount of power to an 
unaccountable super-regulator-a situation to which Congress 
certainly will not accede without a struggle. On the other hand, 
proposals like the three just discussed that change the legislative 
process within Congress but keep political power in that institu-
tion seem easier to implement. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Justice Breyer's proposal is undeniably thought-provoking. His 
book's most significant contribution may be to draw attention to 
the current regulatory regime's systemic problems, thereby en-
couraging serious discussion about how to "reinvent" the regu-
latory process: Breyer courageously points out that the political 
legitimacy of the process rests to some degree on the effective-
ness of its product. Nonetheless, his proposal for correcting the 
problems he perceives will not likely win universal acceptance. 
At its core, however, Breyer's proposal contains a crucial insight 
that must be fully recognized: the current regulatory structure 
contains built-in flaws that contribute to a poor result, and the 
structure must be changed to correct, or at least ameliorate, those 
flaws. Although many will disagree with Justice Breyer's pre-
scription, many more will concur in his message that the system 
needs fixing. 
